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Abstract
Commonsense says we are isolated. After all, our 
bodies are physically separate. But Seneca’s cola-
mus humanitatem, and John Donne’s observation 
that “no man is an island” suggests we are neither 
entirely isolated nor separate. A recent discovery in 
neuroscience—that of mirror neurons—argues that 
the brain and the mind is neither built nor functions 
remote from what happens in other individuals. 
What are mirror neurons? They are brain cells 
that process both what happens to or is done by an 
individual, and, as it were, its perceived “refl ec-
tion,” when that same thing happens or is done by 
another individual. Thus, mirror neurons are both 
activated when an individual does a particular ac-
tion, and when that individual perceives that same 
action done by another. The discovery of mirror 
neurons suggests we need to radically revise our 
notions of human nature since they offer a means 
by which we may not be so separated as we think. 
Humans unlike other apes are adapted to mirror 
interact nonverbally when together. Notably, our 
faces have been evolved to display agile and nim-
ble movements. While this is usually explained 
as enabling nonverbal communication, a better 
description would be nonverbal commune based 
upon mirror neurons. I argue we cherish humanity, 
colamus humanitatem, because mirror neurons and 
our adapted mirror interpersonal interface blur the 
physical boundaries that separate us. 
Resumen
El sentido común dice que estamos aislados. Des-
pués de todo, nuestros cuerpos están separados 
físicamente. Pero la obra Colamus humanitatem 
de Séneca y la observación de que “ningún hombre 
es una isla”, que hizo John Donne, sugieren que no 
estamos ni completamente aislados ni separados. 
Un descubrimiento reciente de la neurociencia, el 
de las neuronas espejo, sostiene que el cerebro y 
la mente no son construidos ni funcionan alejados 
de lo que pasa en otros individuos. ¿Qué son las 
neuronas espejo? Son células cerebrales que pro-
cesan tanto lo que le pasa como lo que hace un in-
dividuo, y, por así decirlo, su “refl exión” percibida 
cuando esa misma cosa le pasa a, o es hecha por, 
otro individuo. Por lo tanto, las neuronas espejo 
se activan cuando una persona realiza una acción 
específi ca y cuando percibe la misma acción rea-
lizada por otro. El descubrimiento de las neuronas 
espejo indica que es preciso revisar radicalmente 
nuestras nociones sobre la naturaleza humana, ya 
que estas neuronas ofrecen un medio por el cual no 
concebimos estar tan separados como pensamos. 
A diferencia de otros simios, los humanos están 
adaptados a interactuar de forma similar no verbal, 
cuando están juntos. De manera particular, nuestras 
caras han evolucionado para mostrar movimientos 
ágiles y rápidos. Mientras esto usualmente expli-
ca cómo se logra la comunicación no verbal, una 
mejor descripción sería la comunicación no verbal 
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basada en las neuronas espejo. El autor sostiene 
que valoramos la humanidad, colamus humanita-
tem, porque las neuronas espejo y nuestra interfaz 
interpersonal adaptada de espejo desdibujan las 
fronteras que nos separan.
Palabras clave: neuronas espejo, empatía, sí 
mismo, emociones sociales, comunicación inter-
personal, sentido de comunidad.
Why cherish humanity—Seneca’s colamus huma-
nitatem? Why care about other people? Why should 
we go beyond the boundaries of our own personal 
lives and value the lives of other men and women? 
Is it, perhaps, because we are all members of the 
same species, Homo sapiens sapiens? Or, maybe, 
it is because when I see another person in pain, I 
know rationally that what they experience is much 
the same as when I suffer myself pain? But these 
answers are not by themselves convincing: for, 
why should the fact that other people are like me 
either in body or in their capacity for experiences 
such as pain, cause me to care or cherish them? 
We do this—and feel we ought to—but it is not 
a logical necessity. After all, the cells of my body 
under the microscope might be much like those of 
earthworms or some other lowly creature but that 
does not mean I should necessarily value the life of 
earthworms. Yet Seneca’s observation about 2000 
years ago touches a deep insight as to human na-
ture and what it is to be a human. An unidentifi ed 
aspect about being a human exists that causes us 
to cherish other people. As John Donne once noted 
in his Devotions that “no man is an island, entire 
to itself,” and “Any man’s death diminishes me, 
because I am involved in Mankind.” Here poets 
catch a truth—but what kind of truth is it—for it is 
not one of logic. Can science illuminate this aspect 
of our unknown humanity?
Here, however, is not a problem that most psy-
chologists and philosophers seek to fathom. Rather 
scholarly and scientifi c attempts to understand the 
nature of humanity mostly start from the premise 
that other people’s experience does not funda-
mentally matter. Yes, people may say words about 
valuing others for courteous appearances but that 
underneath each of our minds really in fact lives as 
isolated as if were an island. As the social psycholo-
gist James Fiske has observed: “From Freud to so-
ciobiologists, from Skinner to social cognitionists, 
from Goffman to game theorists, the assumption in 
Western psychology has been that humans are by 
nature asocial individualists ... social relationships 
are instrumental means to nonsocial ends, or cons-
traints on the satisfaction of individual desires” 
(1992, p. 689). And again, as another psychologist, 
C. Daniel Batson has observed, “Perhaps the rea-
son that psychologists have spent little time on the 
question of our social nature is because they already 
know the answer... our behavior may be highly so-
cial; our thoughts also may be highly social; but in 
our hearts, we live alone... We are social egoists” 
(1990, p. 336). 
Neuroscience, as I will show here, provides 
grounds for rejecting the idea that we are “asocial 
individualists” and “social egoists.” By contrast, 
we now know that the neural fabric out of which 
each of our minds is woven is such that the lives and 
experiences of other people are as vital to us as our 
own. The neuroscience discovery which is respon-
sible for this goes by the name of “mirror neurons.” 
These neurons, I shall argue, support John Donne 
and Seneca’s view of human nature. Neurologica-
lly, no brain is an island. Our neurons wire us to 
exist within, to use a Latin word for “common”, as 
a nonverbal communio, or commune.
What are mirror neurons?
To understand mirror neurons, we need fi rst to 
appreciate how the brain was traditionally—and 
mistakenly—thought to work. If one looks at a 
diagram of the brain, it is labeled with terms such 
as visual, auditory and motor. Thus, there is the 
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visual cortex at the back of the brain that indicates 
that this area handles sight, and the motor cortex 
in the front that this area deals with the body’s 
movements. These areas have divisions; hence 
the motor cortex gets divided up, for example, 
into the primary motor cortex and the premotor 
cortex. There are good reasons for the existence 
of these terms—injury to the visual cortex causes 
blindness and, likewise, injury to the motor cortex 
causes paralysis. This labeling has turned out howe-
ver to cause false expectations about the workings 
of the brain. One of them is that the function of the 
motor cortex areas does not include also an impor-
tant role in perception. After all, labels for percep-
tion such as vision and audition have been given to 
parts of the brain elsewhere. So it was unexpected 
when in 1992 that Giacomo Rizzolatti and collea-
gues of Parma University (1992) found that certain 
neurons in a part of the motor cortex, the F5 inferior 
premotor area, had a role in perception. The motor 
cortex here did not only control the body as might 
be inferred from the label but also perceived the 
movement of other individuals. 
Rizzolatti’s initial work involved macaque 
monkeys using electrodes implanted in their 
brains. What he found was that certain neurons in 
their motor cortex discharged when they did a par-
ticular hand action, say reaching to grasp a raison, 
while others were activated by other actions such 
as tearing something up. Nothing surprising here. 
What was unexpected was that the same neurons 
also discharged when they saw another monkey or 
the experimenter doing these same actions. Thus, 
a neuron would spike when a monkey grabbed a 
raison and also when it saw the experimenter grab 
one, and different neurons would be activated for 
different actions such as tearing and seeing another 
individual tearing. Neurologically, these neurons 
were like mirrors refl ecting what others did in the 
external world onto the brain doing same actions. 
Since 1992 several more things have been es-
tablished about mirror neurons. They are not con-
fi ned to monkeys: functional brain imaging and 
other techniques fi nds them also in humans. When 
people observe actions made by other individuals, 
much the same areas in their brains lighted up as 
when they perform them. Such mirroring only 
applies to actions done by bodies – those done by 
robots do not activate these neurons (Tai, Scherfl er, 
Brooks, Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004). Such brain 
areas respond, moreover, not only to the sight of 
other movements but also their perception through 
sound (Galati et al., 2008). (This might seem an 
obscure point but in fact our vocal ability to pro-
nounce a word or name that we have just overheard 
depends upon such auditory-motor mirroring.) The 
activation of mirror neurons occurs even when the 
object of an action is hidden, provided the intention 
of the goal of the movement is clear (Umilta et al., 
2001). Mirroring applies to emotional expression 
and experience also, for example, when we see the 
expression of disgust on the face of another person 
after smelling a revolting odor, we activate the sa-
me areas in our own brain (the anterior insular—a 
part of the emotional brain near the motor cortex) 
that gets activated when we ourselves smell that 
odor and express disgust (Wicker et al., 2003). If 
we see another individual with an electrode on their 
hand that gives painful shocks and then a cue when 
they are electrocuted, many of the same parts of our 
brains get activated as when we receive an electric 
shock (Singer et al., 2004). 
Mirror neurons, or neurons related to them are 
found outside the motor cortex. Mirror neurons 
are found in the posterior parietal cortex, though 
these neurons are concerned with the kinesthetic 
and somatosensory aspects of actions rather than 
their execution. As already noted, mirror neurons 
related to affective reactions such as disgust are 
found in the insula cortex suggesting the existence 
of mirror neurons for the expression of emotions. 
Mirror neuron-like cells have also been found in the 
superior temporal sulcus area. These neurons are 
particularly interesting because though they are not 
activated by a person’s own movement, they get acti-
vated by what is called “biological motion” (Johans-
son, 1973). To gain a sense of what biological mo-
tion entails, imagine a person masked and wearing 
black in a black room with light diodes attached to 
their limbs so they cannot be seen; only the dots of 
light they are wearing. Remarkably, when an indi-
vidual walks, jumps and in other ways moves—the 
movement of the light dots lets us identify instantly 
what they are doing, even though we cannot see 
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   101 7/31/08   4:48:16 PM
?John R. Skoyles
 102?Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 99-111/2008/ISSN1794-4724 
their actual bodies. People have been found to be 
able to identify immediately not only what someo-
ne is doing—walking, dancing, and so on—from 
the movements of such light dots, but also their 
gender and who the individual is—we each have 
our own movement signature. Interestingly, we can 
identify such movements as having been made by 
us rather than someone else which is remarkable 
since we never or only rarely see our own actions.
The existence of mirror neurons might on fi rst 
impressions seem rather odd. But there is a subtle 
logic at work if we appreciate that the general wor-
kings of the motor cortex is not like that implied 
by most diagrams of its functioning. This is often 
of some piano-like mechanism in which motor 
neuron activation as it were hit keys that then act 
like hammers upon strings upon the body’s mus-
cles. The motor cortex is not like this, for a start it 
is not a motor-muscle cortex as much as a motor-
goal one. While there is a homunculus general 
layout of the body on the motor cortex, it is very 
much more rough than, say the one for our sense 
of touch upon our body in the somatosensory cor-
tex, or the retina in the visual cortex. This refl ects 
the fact that the motor cortex does not control 
muscles, but a much higher level of movement 
creation—that concerned with programming motor 
goals. Such programming is unlike that done by any 
robot—if we make a reaching movement to grab, 
say, an apple, and our hand receives a sudden jolt 
that displaces it from its planned course, our motor 
system automatically compensates so that our hand 
still reaches its target—the apple. No robot can do 
this. The motor cortex is concerned with processing 
the motor goals, like reaching the apple, rather than 
processing the particular muscles used by our arm 
and hand. 
This higher level of processing allows the mo-
tor cortex to process movements independently 
of the body, for example, when we imagine, as if, 
making an action in “our heads.” When we menta-
lly imagine in this way making a motor action, we 
light up much the same parts of the brain that get 
activated when we actually make that movement. 
Here, we are as it were mirroring not another’s ac-
tion but our own in our own thoughts. The curious 
thing is that such imagination has real effects on 
actual bodily actions—we improve our skills in 
them. One explanation is that what we are doing is 
rehearsing the motor goals which organize actual 
movements. Motor skill requires the ability to co-
ordinate together such goals—learning to tie a knot 
is less a skill in movement than doing actions in the 
right order. More is involved in the link between 
imagination and actual processing than this though 
since it applies also to when we visualize in our 
imagination seeing an object. When we do this we 
activate many of the same visual areas involved 
when we actually recognize and see that object. A 
general rule of function in the brain seems to be that 
online and offl ine processing take place in many of 
the same brain areas. 
Motor imagination concerns our own move-
ments but it readily blends into mirroring the actual 
world. For example, when asked to judge whether 
a glove shape fi ts the left or right hand, we activa-
te a part of the appropriate right or left side of the 
motor area in our brains that controls which of our 
hands would fi t that glove. We, in a sense, identify 
whether a glove would fi t our left or right hand by 
imagining the appropriate part of our body and 
seeing how it would fi t into the glove (Parsons 
et al., 1995). It is a small jump from this for such 
neurons in their processing to imagine what it is 
like to be another. 
Motor perception
The neuroscience discussed above gains its full 
importance from what psychologists have found 
about movement and perception. In what follows, 
I am slightly speculative because the phenomena 
I mention have not all so far been linked directly 
to the mirror neurons and the motor cortex. But 
that is due to lack of research, not lack of logical 
connection. 
Ten years before Rizzolatti’s discovery of mi-
rror neurons, for example, Jennifer Freyd found that 
people after seeing a photograph of a human action 
had diffi culties rejecting other pictures from a se-
quence of photos of the action taken later on (1982). 
This suggested that when people had looked at 
that static image, they had storied it in terms of its 
dynamic body movement—which would suggest 
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that when we look at actions we do not recognize 
them as objects but in terms of their actions. It is 
reasonable to suggest that this happens in motor 
neurons responsible in us for controlling the sa-
me kind of movement. In another case of motor 
perception Jennifer Freyd and Maggie Shiffrar 
(1990) found that when we see “apparent motion” 
between two alternating static pictures of a per-
son doing an action, what we see links not to the 
shortest possible path between the two images but 
to the anatomical plausible action that links them. 
Again, this suggests that our perception of bodily 
movements happens not in terms of objects but in 
terms of knowledge held in the motor cortex as to 
how our own movements could carry them out. In 
a sense, the brain sees the actions of others by pa-
rasitizing its own knowledge of the actions it can 
do with its body. 
But perception must go much deeper than even 
this. Take the following example of motor per-
ception found in the illusion created fi rst by Paolo 
Viviani at the University of Geneva (1992). Here 
Paolo Viviani presented a light dot on a screen mo-
ving repetitively around an elliptical path. What 
is odd is that when people look at its movement, 
they see it as only uniform if it imitates the biome-
chanical constraints of a human hand moving the 
dot along that path—faster when curvature is less, 
slowing down at the sharper ends. Such percep-
tion is so powerfully shaped by our sense of action 
that Viviani found that a gradual shift of the path 
to a circle went unnoticed providing the elliptical 
velocity was retained. Here, our perception is of 
an abstract movement that we could make. Again, 
this suggests that mirror neurons enable us to see 
the world fi lled not so much in terms of objects as 
with actions which with we, as if as it were, “em-
pathize.” 
Such motor empathy can be practical in various 
ways. Consider the problem of recognizing cursi-
vely joined handwritten letters. We do it automa-
tically, but there are few clues as to which letter 
strokes matches which alphabetic letter—it is not 
like identifying an object where we are presented 
with many sources of information in the form of co-
lor, form and shape. Mary Babcock of Cornell Uni-
versity (1988) has found that people identify cursive 
letters at least in part from the dynamic information 
their drawing strokes contain about how they were 
written. If you look closely at the strokes of letters, 
they have slightly different angles and curves de-
pending upon which letter preceded them. The ellip-
tical beginning of the stroke starting the letter “l” 
after another “l” has a different shape to that after 
an “m.” The brain when looking at the lines making 
up such letters picks up from such clues how they 
were written to identify what they are. And this 
applies not just to alphabetic handwriting: Jean-
Pierre Orliaguet in France (1997) has found that 
Chinese logographs are perceived in terms of the 
fl ow of the movement strokes used to paint them. 
This would seem a factor in the perception of Chi-
nese and Japanese logographs which are often learnt 
fi rst by learning how to draw them. A group from 
Japan has even reported motor cortex activation 
accompanies the perception of oriental writing. 
Mirror neurons and human nature
Why do mirror neurons exist? One idea is that they 
might have arisen to aid motor imitation. Individual 
monkeys spend months learning skills such as how 
to best crack open a nut – it would advantage ano-
ther monkey to get a head start on learning that skill 
by observation. However, learning by imitation is 
unlikely why mirror neurons arose. First, as noted, 
they exist due to how the motor cortex organizes 
actions in terms of goals. This suggests that when 
a mirror neuron is activated by an observed action, 
it is a case of what Stephen Gould called an exapta-
tion (Gould & Vrba, 1982). An exaptation contrasts 
to an adaptation -- in an adaptation, the origin of 
a thing arises from its utility, but with an exapta-
tion, its origins come from it being a fortuitous and 
incidental side effect of something else—in the case 
of mirror neurons, to the already existing processes 
of motor neurons. A second reason is that nonhu-
man primates do not readily imitate. This may be 
surprising—after all, “to ape” means “to copy.” But 
in spite of intense research, the search for evidence 
that monkeys and chimpanzees imitate, has not been 
very fruitful—the conclusion is that in general “apes 
do not ape.” This applies not just to the copying of 
body movements but also vocalizations. 
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Evolution could, however, have developed 
mirror neurons, once they had arisen as part of 
the motor cortex. Exaptations—incidental side 
effects—can be the raw stuff upon which natural 
selection works. Further, and this is an idea that I 
will now expand upon—mirror neurons could have 
shaped the evolution of the body. The nature of this 
will become clearer in the next sections. In these I 
shall argue that human evolution changed us so it 
could exploit mirror neurons. This story, I suggest, 
underlies our ability to create tools, language, so-
ciability, cognitively put ourselves in other people’s 
“shoes,” and even the very reason why we seek to 
understand “human nature.” 
Human evolution and mirror neurons: 
Hands and tools
Many animals use and make tools including chim-
panzees and the New Caledonian crows. But no-
thing compares to the abilities of our species—
from early infancy, we are described by child 
psychologists as “copying machines.” It is in part, 
a result of our large brains being able to organize 
the complex actions needed to fashion tools and 
then use them. Another factor is that hands are “de-
signed” to be dexterous. But I will argue a further 
factor was the prior existence of mirror neurons. 
First, I will focus upon our hands—they differ 
from those of other apes but not in the way most 
people imagine (Napier, 1993). Other apes, like us 
have an opposable thumb. And fi nger control of 
even monkeys can, like ours, be precise, for exam-
ple, when using their hands to feed delicately upon 
seeds. Anatomically, slight variations in ligaments 
and muscles also exist. But the key difference is 
that humans do not use their arms and hands for get-
ting about. Bipedality freed our upper bodies. The 
muscles, ligaments, joints and bones of our upper 
limbs as a result do not have to carry body weight 
when climbing or knuckle walking. That might 
seem a rather small point but the impact upon our 
arms and particularly our hands was enormous. It 
enabled them to specialize without compromise in 
excellence in hand control. The fi ngers of chimpan-
zees, for example are long and their thumbs short—
adaptations which aid tree climbing and knuckle 
walking. But your fi ngers and thumb are just the 
right lengths to work easily with each other—just 
play around with your hands and you will feel how 
well your fi ngers and your thumbs fi t. To carrying 
body weight, chimpanzee wrists and fi ngers liga-
ments are thick and strong, but those in our hands 
are only stiffened suffi ciently to enable dexterous 
fi nger movements. 
There is another factor: feel the tips of your 
thumb and fi ngers; they have broad nails and soft 
fl esh pads. Prick them and they bleed as they are 
rich in blood vessels—these are need to support a 
skin dense with sensory nerve endings. Such sen-
sitive fi nger tips are unique to us—in other apes 
they are narrow and hard and backed by very tough 
nails—good for climbing and grabbing on surfaces 
but not for touch manipulation. 
Those fi nger pads revolutionized the hand by 
giving the brain a vast range of complex and hierar-
chical motor goals linked to their touch awareness. 
Here is where mirror neurons became important. 
When you observe another person making delicate 
fi nger movements, say when they tie a knot, you 
see their fi ngers moving sequentially in terms of 
their “touch space.” You see not so much fi nger 
movements as a sequence of fi nger goals. As a re-
sult, there is much more to motor mirror. Finger and 
thumb touch pads arose to make highly dexterous 
fi nger actions, in particular, for manufacturing and 
using tools and artifacts. The usefulness of such 
skills, however, fi rst depended upon the ability to 
acquire them. When the organization of actions 
are simple, an individual can learn them on their 
own, but with the complex ones needed to make 
artifacts, an individual must pick them up—at least 
in part—from others. Thus, the brain’s ability to 
imitate was critical in the evolution of fi nger pads 
since without the ability to copy fi nger skills, there 
would be no advantage in them. Mirror neurons, of 
course, played a key part in enabling such imitation 
and so the rise of our specialized fi ngers. 
Vocalization
When we consider imitation, we think of hand mo-
vements or perhaps, the vocal copying of birds such 
as parrots. We may be aware that we can imitate 
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other individual’s speech but do not give it promi-
nence as a skill, nor as a key innovation in the ori-
gin of language. That honor we give to syntax and 
semantics. But our abilities to mimic speech are 
remarkable and central to the existence of language 
(Skoyles, 1998). Other animals may communicate 
but humans are unique in doing so by means of a 
vocabulary of many tens of thousands of words and 
names. The existence of vocabulary thus depends 
upon an ability to acquire all these thousands of 
pronunciations. Not just any means, but one that 
can do so in very young children in spite of the fact 
that their vocal organs have a different shape and 
size to adults and older children whose pronun-
ciations they copy. And, of course, such imitation 
must convert information contained in sound into 
vocalizations. Thankfully, we are all rather good at 
doing this, as can be seen when we shadow speech 
containing unfamiliar words. After strokes, people 
may lose their ability to initiate speech but can still 
echo what they hear other say. The size of a child’s 
vocabulary, as might be expected, depends upon 
their earlier ability to repeat unfamiliar words. Part 
of the trick has been to make the sounds of speech 
those that are easiest to replicate. Though it tends 
to get overlooked as an insignifi cant detail about 
speech but its most elementary units, phones, are 
scientifi cally characterized not in terms of audi-
tory sound but the manner and place in the vocal 
track in which they are made. Indeed, one theory 
of hearing speech called—the “motor theory of 
speech perception”—argues that we hear words 
in terms of how they are articulated (Liberman & 
Mattingly, 1985). 
Here we can see a fundamental importance for 
mirror neurons—in fact two. First, vocabulary ba-
sed language got off the ground due to the ability 
provided by mirror neurons to copy vocal articula-
tions. Second, such mirror neurons shaped the very 
vocalizations that make up speech. If you refl ect 
on it, learning vocabulary is a bottle neck upon the 
development of speech. As such, it will powerfully 
shape speech sounds by causing the preferential 
propagation of those sounds which are most easy 
to copy. Sounds which are not so easy to imitate 
will not be picked up by new speakers leaving only 
those speech sounds that are easy to copy (Skoyles, 
1998). Mirror neurons, in other words, in the past 
caused a mini natural selection upon speech sounds 
with the criteria of survival being imitiability. 
Mirror neurons and our face
Mirroring is closely linked to sociability in 
certain animals, though not nonhuman primates 
such as chimpanzees. Dolphins in particular show 
spontaneous social imitation not only of each other 
but even of humans. A human trainer making a head 
movement visible through a port hole in a tank to 
a dolphin will see the dolphin trying to interact by 
copying their movements—shaking their heads if 
the trainer shakes their own head (Delfour & Mar-
ten, 2001). The sounds of dolphins also involve 
much imitation. Recent research shows that dol-
phins have as complex social lives as chimpanzees. 
Why then do dolphins but not chimpanzees use 
mirroring in their sociability? The reason lies in 
the different opportunities for interaction offered 
by life in water compared to that on land. A chim-
panzee can smell another, they can mutually groom, 
and they live in a shared territory. Dolphins cannot 
do these things. Fortunately, life in water makes 
imitation of movement and sound easy, which lets 
movement (together with sounds) take their place. 
There is no problem of gravity. If a chimp copies 
another’s movement its motor neurons must work 
out the different effects of gravity upon its own and 
the other individual’s movements. While this is 
not impossible—we can do them all the time, they 
are a problem that dolphins in water can ignore (for 
the same reasons that astronauts to train for gravity-
free existence, do so in water tanks). 
Human evolution made mirroring much easier 
for us than for a chimp. As noted, bipedality freed 
our hands to become highly dexterous because of 
imitation. And bipedality even itself aided mirro-
ring as it causes us to keep a constant posture—
even when sitting we tend to keep our upper bodies 
in the vertical. Chimps, in contrast, live much of 
their lives in the horizontal plane as they climb and 
knuckle walk. As a result, we present ourselves 
to each other in a much more constant position—
we rarely interact with people who are upside 
down. Moreover, because it is erect we are in the 
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   105 7/31/08   4:48:16 PM
?John R. Skoyles
 106?Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 99-111/2008/ISSN1794-4724 
position which is most easy to see. That makes it 
easier to mirror each other. 
But these merely aid mirroring—in contrast, 
mirror neurons seem to have actively shaped our 
faces. To appreciate this, look at your own face in a 
mirror. Human faces—and your facial movements 
upon it—are unique among primates in having been 
selected to be easily seen. 
First, alone amongst mammals, the sclera of the 
human eye—the area surrounding our iris and pu-
pils—is exposed, wide and white. In other animals, 
the surrounding area is either minimally exposed, or 
dark to mask the visibility of the pupil. This makes 
sense: eyes are easily spotted by predators and so 
it advantages an animal to make them diffi cult to 
see. And for animals that are predators, they need 
to hide their eyes least their potential prey detect 
them. But the human species has eyes that are visi-
ble to onlookers—our sclera is exposed and white 
so that others can see it contrasted with our dark 
pupils. This does not advantage their function as 
organs of sight but makes their movements highly 
noticeable (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001). 
A further difference is that compared with other 
apes, our faces are not framed by hair. Chimp fa-
ces are surrounded by fur—this makes them less 
easy to see. But human faces particularly those of 
the young and women limit the presence of hair 
except to the top of the head and above the eyes. 
Having a “good head of hair” cuts the chance of 
heat stroke that we risk when standing upright from 
the overhead sun. Eye brows are also functional: 
they are in effect sweat bands that stop brow sweat 
running down and stinging our eyes. (One needs 
here a brief distraction to mention that such swea-
ting and nakedness links to three unique features 
of our species. First, we can run energetically for 
many hours—most animals move fast only in brief 
spurts. The reason for this is that we have a second 
uniqueness: The adaptation to get rid of the heat 
caused by the muscular exertion of constant ex-
hausting activity by sweat evaporation. A runner, 
for example, can during a marathon lose fi ve quarts 
of sweat. This leads in turn to a third uniqueness: 
If we were covered with fur, that sweat could not 
cool our bodies by evaporation—it would either 
drip off or form a sticky mess. Thus, unlike all other 
primates, we are nearly entirely naked. See Skoyles 
& Sagan, 2002.) 
There are other features linked to our visibility 
such as the reddening of our lips that make them 
and their movements more easily seen, and that our 
facial skin can blush. All together, this suggests that 
our faces have been subject to a natural selection to 
make them, and what happens on them, visible and 
distinct. Why? It is a story that, I suggest, involves 
mirror neurons. 
Our faces are not only uniquely easy to see 
but also make movements that are worth looking 
at. One might invent a phrase and call our faces a 
“motor exposure board.” It is packed with mus-
cles but it is the looseness of fl esh that makes their 
movements so delicately and agilely expressive—
anatomically, we have much the same facial mus-
cles as chimpanzees (though our ones are more 
differentiated). Feel your face—what your fi ngers 
prod and massage is remarkably loose and soft—
there is nothing “leathery” about your face. This 
subtle fl esh is exclusive to us. As a result we can 
much more agile use of our faces to make expres-
sions. And not just the ones we see, but also micro 
expressions that fl ash across it for a 15th of a second. 
If you look at real people talking at say a station 
or airport, you will see that people’s faces are in 
constant movement. 
But this is only the beginning of an explana-
tion—since why do we so persistently make these 
agile facial movements when with others? The 
obvious answer—and it is not entirely wrong—is 
that our faces enable us to communicate by making 
facial gestures, the familiar expressions of smiles, 
raised fearful eye brows, grimaces of disgust and 
down turned sad mouths. There is a universal com-
munication system here—a smile says happiness 
whatever our language. But this expression of 
emotion is only part of the story of our faces. For 
a start, people are not that good at reading them as 
they confuse the expressions for fear and surprise, 
as well as the ones for anger and disgust. Further, 
chimps also use most of these expressions. In addi-
tion to emotional expressions—which are easy to 
study—we also engage when with others in what 
might be called facial animation in activity that is 
less easy to investigate. As noted, researchers that 
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   106 7/31/08   4:48:16 PM
Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 99-111/2008/ISSN1794-4724 ? 107
Why our brains cherish humanity: Mirror neurons and colamus humanitatem ?
slow down videos of faces in communication fi nd 
that we make micro expressions that do not get 
consciously noticed. But while they do not enter 
awareness, they are important as they let our faces 
say, “I heard you,” “it is now my turn,” “I am fo-
llowing what you say,” and “I am with you.” Our 
faces are not fl ashing out signs merely for “I am 
happy” or “I am sad”—they go far beyond this—
they echo our social presence with each other. 
William Condon of the University of Pittsburgh 
(1966) showed that people synchronize their voices 
with their body, arm and facial movements during 
conversation. He did this by looking at fi lm taken 
at 48 frames per second. As two people talked, he 
was able to track a harmonious organization of 
movements between their bodies and speech—“the 
body,” as he put it, “of the listener dances in rhythm 
with that of the speaker.” Thus, the animation of 
our hands and our motor exposure board—our 
faces—is a subtle mirror upon which we bounce off 
expressions. The agility of the movement intercour-
se can be a shock when we have nothing to do but 
look at strangers in a public place. When engaged 
with others, the activity of faces does not register; 
but being outside a conversation we can see how 
subtly, agilely and exactly mouths contort, eyes 
raise and head and hands jog about in rhythm with 
each other. People might feel they are only talking 
but they are also sharing social presence through 
an intricate facial and bodily tango. 
Ulf Dimberg (1982) has researched how the 
electromyclographic (EMG) responses of people’s 
face muscles such as the zygomaticus major and 
corrugator supercilii of observers react when they 
see facial expressions made with these muscles. 
What Dimberg found is that we ever so slightly 
mirror in our own faces the expressions that we 
see in others. Thus we are not only synchronizing 
our movements, but also at the same time—at 
least ever so slightly—mirroring them. People not 
only mimic the movements but mimicry strongly 
affects others. Tanya Chartrand (1999) has found 
that people feel a strong rapport and personal liking 
for an individual that copies their own movements. 
But more than copying is going on, as this hidden 
mirroring does not usually become the basis of 
an exact copy. What is reciprocated is contingen-
cy since provides the cue for another related and 
linked expression. Mirror neurons responsible 
for expressions using the zygomaticus major and 
corrugator supercilii get activated by the sight of 
facial expressions using them, and such activa-
tion overfl ows to trigger the movements of these 
or other muscles. 
Such mirroring, of course, helps smooth inter-
personal interaction, not only by making our faces 
more communicative. We need to be able to pick up 
information such as when people are losing interest 
in what we are saying, or seek a turn in the conver-
sation. But even this hardly begins to express the 
function of our faces which has to do with making 
and sharing social togetherness. Here we are dis-
cussing, not a skill but one of the things that is most 
intimate to us as real, living humans. Consider what 
it would be like to have a face no one wants to inte-
ract with such as the “hideously” malformed one of 
Joseph Carey Merrick, the “Elephant man” (1862-
1890). Facial deformity is a tragedy that really 
should not rationally exist—after all, whatever the 
appearance of our faces it can still be functional in 
allowing us to normally talk, breathe and eat, whi-
le the movements of other parts of our bodies can 
take the place of turn taking in a conversation. They 
are in a way “redundant.” But if we imagine what it 
would be like being Joseph Merrick, we know that 
they are critical to our existence—a display board 
upon which we show and share our humanity. That 
is why the situation of Joseph Merrick touches us 
so profoundly: he was human—but due to the gross 
abnormality of his face, he was excluded, or nearly 
so, from sharing that humanity with others. Without 
the efforts of Sir Frederick Treves, the actress Mrs. 
Kendall and other good hearted people, the human 
that was Joseph Merrick would have been a very 
isolated island at a freak show. The quotes around 
“hideous” above need to be there, he was not hi-
deous—it is in us, not him that in which the horror 
lies. Researchers that describe the function of our 
faces as non-verbal communication therefore seem 
to profoundly miss the point of having—or rather 
living as—a face. The facially deformed can make 
such communication or at least communicate their 
equivalents. The tone of our voice, for example, 
can convey whether we are happy or not. What a 
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   107 7/31/08   4:48:16 PM
?John R. Skoyles
 108?Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 99-111/2008/ISSN1794-4724 
person with a deformed face cannot do is the dance 
of interpersonal togetherness as few want to look 
at a deformed face. 
Our faces are therefore I suggest not so much 
communication devices but communion ones. 
The word “communion” comes from the Latin 
communio which simply means “common.” Holy 
Communion in a service of common union—in-
dividuals which are separate are no longer so. 
But the word can be used more widely: a dance 
between two people can be cognitively—at least 
in motor terms—a communion. We do not com-
municate anything by doing a waltz or rumba, we 
use it to share a mutual social presence. What we do 
is cease to be separate islands—for a moment the 
movements of two people interact and live as 
one. Behaviorally, two people organize themselves 
as if one body. Social communion not communica-
tion is the basis of our existence as social entities. 
After all, little of what we say either by words 
or nonverbal language concerns the pure transfer 
of information. Gossip, chit chat, the casual “how 
are you” patter of ordinary conversation may use 
words that communicate information but what 
is being transacted is togetherness. We do not like 
being alone. We seek relationships—we are an 
immensely social primate—and our relationships 
need to be kept in repair. Our faces evolved as ex-
quisite display boards not to provide information 
but to enable people to be with each other through 
social mirroring. Two computers, after all, might 
communicate information between each other not 
to transfer information but to check that they are 
still connected. 
We not only dance with each other nonverba-
lly, but how we do so happens with a behavioral 
accent or dialect. Culture takes many forms but 
one of them is how we bounce our expressions off 
each other. The global variation in hand and facial 
gestures is well known. To greet, Indians put their 
hands together on their chests in a praying position 
while making a slight bow, Arabs sweep their right 
hand upward touching their hearts and foreheads, 
the Japanese bow, the Maoris of New Zealand rub 
noses while Tibetan tribesmen stick their tongues 
out. Under this, as it were tip of an iceberg, there 
is a vast subtlety in how people nonverbally dance 
with each other as they engage in social commu-
nion. When we visit people in foreign places—we 
feel a certain strangeness in their manners. People 
interact with a different fl ow and rhythm to that 
with which we are familiar. There is nothing sur-
prising here since the fact that people have different 
vocal accents is well recognized. People pick up the 
subtle ways of their social group in which we string 
together speech sounds. We do likewise in how we 
articulate our faces and bodies when together. Or 
rather it is that our mirror neurons pick up these 
subtle differences. 
Mirror neurons thus tune us as belonging to 
a particular group. Humans have a need for this 
behavioral identifi cation of our home group since 
unlike other primates our sense of smell is much 
reduced (not least because standing upright our no-
se is in the wrong place). But that reduction could 
only have happened because we could substitute a 
behavioral alternative in its place. We, therefore, 
know a person belongs to our group not by how 
they smell but how they interact. We sniff, as it 
were, the “accent” of their behavior, and sense a 
reassuring familiarity. But equally we can detect 
a sense of strangeness. Mirror neurons, therefore, 
which have given us a powerful capacity to make 
social communion and so remove the boundaries 
which separate us as humans also as a result have a 
powerful downside—in that they can also lead us to 
experience other humans as lacking our humanity. 
If people are of a different social group, we fail to 
sense what binds us together. Our feelings do not 
resonant and as a result, it is easy to cease to care if 
we hurt them, or treat them in ways we would not 
our own kin or kind. 
The role of mirror neurons in sociability makes 
human experience very different to that of chim-
panzees. Chimpanzees lack this ability to engage 
with each other. They have little ability, for 
example, to share a mutual rhythm. In spite of the 
efforts of Sue Savage Rumbaugh to get Kanzi to 
dance and bang away with her in tempo, he fi nds 
it hard to pace along with her. Mirror neurons by 
synchronizing our interactions make us radically 
different to chimps. Few children, after all, have 
diffi culty in making a dance, beating a drum, or 
singing a song. To be human is to love to mirror 
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what you do with what I do. This is not to say that 
chimpanzees are not social and have as much need 
as we do to be accepted. But that they do this instead 
through olfaction and mutual grooming. Only hu-
mans create their sense of social existence through 
conversing or sharing music in the synchronized 
activation of mirror neurons. 
The mutual refl ecting of mirroring has the con-
sequence of forcing us to be equals. But this is not 
always wanted, particularly if some individuals 
are more powerful and wanted to be treated wi-
th a high social status. Such individuals seek to 
stop the equality that comes with social mirroring. 
That is not hard: if you can stop others seeing you, 
then you can prevent them striking up a relationship 
with you as an equal. People can be stopped from, 
for example, in some cultures it is an offense to 
look at royalty. And this can be achieved not only 
by social taboos and rules about looking at each 
other. There are several reasons for the existence 
of facial hair on mature men. For example, it marks 
out dominant individuals in a group, like the lion’s 
main. But another a linked reason is that it makes 
it harder for young men and women to mirror older 
men and so level their relationship with them. 
Mirror neurons and minds
Mirror neurons underlie, it has been argued, our 
capacity to “put ourselves in other people’s shoes.” 
Scientists call this “the theory of mind.” To illus-
trate what this involves, consider the following 
test that uses a puppet story. First, the child sees 
a puppet called Sally who hides a marble in a 
basket and then goes away. While she is gone, they 
see another puppet enter and take the marble and 
put it into a covered box. The Sally puppet returns. 
The child then is asked, “Where will Sally look for 
her marble?” Answering this correctly requires an 
ability to put ourselves in Sally’s position and see 
what she might know. We have to put ourselves, as 
we say, in her shoes and so enter her inner world 
and see what she might infer within. In a word, we 
need to mirror what is in her mind. 
This ability to put oneself in another’s shoes 
has been attributed to mirror neurons. After all, 
these enable us to put, as it were, our own bo-
dies—or at least our control of them—into those 
of others when viewing their situation and actions. 
Here neurons with which we organize behavior 
perceive what it would be to organize another’s 
behavior given what they know and their goals.
Interestingly, it is not a skill that all individuals 
possess. While those with Downs Syndrome have 
no problems with the Sally puppet task, those with 
autism fi nd it hard. Or if they manage to answer 
the task correctly, they do it oddly. Normally, we 
know spontaneously what Sally knows without 
any thought. But when those with autism manage 
to answer correctly, they do so by working it out as 
it were an intellectual problem. 
Controversy exists how far nonhuman primates 
are able to read “minds.” Many of the cases which 
we might feel show the evidence that chimps and 
other animals can do this turn out to be explaina-
ble in terms of acquired associations. Even if they 
do, it seems they have such abilities only to a very 
limited extent compared to that of humans. This 
is not to say other animals cannot empathize with 
suffering. Monkeys, for example, trained to pull a 
cord for a food reward stop when they see that this 
electrocutes a monkey in the next cage. But this 
does not originate in a theory of mind skill—very 
young infants also, for example, get upset with the 
suffering of others even though they are too young 
for this skill. It seems that mirror neurons while 
present in other primates fail to get used in cogni-
tion, while humans have exploited them to create 
many diverse ways. Perhaps they had an even more 
profound effect upon us. 
Beyond mirror neurons to human nature
You are reading this because you are interested in 
human nature. Every religion provides an answer 
of some kind to this question. Why is this question 
so important, however? I suggest it is more than 
curiosity, and has to do with the central problem 
mirror neurons pose for our lives. If we create a 
sense of social togetherness through mirroring then 
it matters how similar we are—and with whom? 
How easily will it be for me to mirror another? Is 
there some core nature in me and all other humans 
in which we can fi nd a common refl ection?
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During a talk upon whether animals suffer, a 
speaker switched in her slides without anyone no-
ticing from asking whether animals had feelings to 
asking how they were like us. Questions about what 
is similar in our nature are not distant from those 
about who has feelings. When we ask, say, whether 
stones, snails, fi sh, cats, dogs, monkeys or apes 
have feelings—the question comes down to how 
similar they are to us. But why should this be so? 
One answer is our mirror neurons. After all, if we 
cannot mirror what is going on with another entity, 
we cannot attribute to it our own experiences such 
as feelings. But what is similar? It does not have to 
be that of looks—we do not look like dogs—but we 
feel they have feelings. But we can empathize with 
them since dogs mirror our social interactions with 
them—it may be a tail wag rather than a smile—
but the contingency to our own movements lets 
us “mirror.” Mirroring, similarity, feelings, and 
our sense of the essence of ourselves—our human 
nature—are thus all intertwined. 
Conclusions
Natural selection created in us a brain that could 
care in a way which no other animal brain can. It did 
this because it created a brain that mirrored other 
individuals. At the most basic level this concerns 
the animation which happens when we conver-
se. But from this foundation, it readily develops 
other cognitions built upon mirroring from which 
our humanity is built. It enables us to experien-
ce others as having minds. It enables us to ask 
the question, How far are others like us? While we 
may be physically separate, that due to mirror neu-
rons our minds are not. They provide a cognitive 
communion, they prevent us experiencing indivi-
duals merely as objects but as having minds. 
There is another side to Seneca’s colamus hu-
manitatem, cherish humanity. Terence, an African 
slave that became one of Rome’s greatest drama-
tists and poets once observed: homo sum: humani 
nil a me alienum puto—I am a human being, so 
nothing human is strange to me. We can now see 
why. We care about each other not because we ra-
tionally know that our bodies and experiences are 
similar but because our awareness is built upon 
the neurological equivalent of a mirror. Rationa-
lity has nothing to do with it. Empathy is rooted 
in the very process by which we form our sense of 
self. Part of our brains is, as it were, blind folded 
as to whether that pain is happening in our own 
body or that of another. This gives us an automatic 
sense that another’s suffering is my business and 
unease—at least to prevent and heal. Mirror neu-
rons suggest we can never properly understand 
our nature in terms of being asocial individualists 
or social egoists. Such limited social psychology 
does not fi t in with the evolution of our brains 
and so our minds. But mirror neurons offer us an 
opportunity to reappreciate such thinkers as John 
Donne. Mirror neurons argue it is not merely theo-
logy that “no man is an island, entire to itself,” or 
“Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am 
involved in Mankind.” These are also truths of the 
human brain. 
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